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Human activity has reshaped all parts of the Earth system. For this reason, a vast majority of 
geologists at the 35th International Geological Congress in Cape Town (September 2016) 
spoke out in favor of changing the classification of geological epochs and of declaring a new 
world age – the Anthropocene. This chapter points at implications that the proclamation of the 
Anthropocene should have for the currently relevant concept of democracy. In particular, it is 
argued that the transition into a new phase of geology also necessitates a further advancement 
of our form of government. Democracy, as it has been conceived of and practiced until now, 
has to a large extent ignored the problem of ‘presentism’. This chapter suggests an extension 
of the 300-years-old separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial 
branch. It is argued that in order to make our political system more future-oriented, there is a 
need for a new (fourth) branch which ensures that the interests of future generations be taken 
into account within today's decision-making process. Newly-established embodiments of the 
proposed future branch, such as offices for future generations (OFGs), could have the right to 
introduce legislation, integrating the competences of this new institution with those of 
parliament. The chapter concludes with a discussion about the legitimacy of the proposed 
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Anthropocene and ethics 
Classifying the history of Earth in geochronology 
The need for designating geological eras first came up when the theological doctrine that the 
Earth had to be at most 6000 years old according to the bible was refuted during the age of the 
Enlightenment.1 This was a turning point in the human conception of self. The grasping of 
basic geological facts since the end of the 17th century, most notably the insight into the 
Earth’s strikingly old age, rank among the most important achievements of human thought. 
The invention and refinement of a geological time scale to subdivide 4.6 billion years of Earth 
history has implications for the self-concept of humanity that can hardly be overstated. For 
only now do humans know where they stand. Against this background, the significance of the 
pending proclamation of the Anthropocene becomes clear: It, too, may significantly alter the 
human conception of self. It is thus with good reason that the idea of labelling our current age 
the ‘Anthropocene’ has attracted wide interest as of late. A Google scholar-search in February 
2018 with the term ‘Anthropocene’ coughs up around 51,500 results; dozens of eminent 
readings are listed on the ‘Anthropocene’ article at wikipedia.org, and first academic journals 
with ‘Anthropocene’ in the title have been founded. 
 
Literally speaking, the term ‘Anthropocene’ can be translated as the ‘Epoch of Men’ or ‘Age 
of Men’, with ‘anthropos’ (Ancient Greek: ‘human’) connected to the suffix ‘-cene’ used to 
designate new geological epochs. According to the geological timescale currently in place, we 
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Table 1: Excerpt of the currently valid geological timescale. 
Note: For the full picture, including the major events of each epoch, see 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geologic_time_scale. The ‘correct’ subdivision of earth history 
into systems, series and stages in chronostratigraphy or into periods, epochs and ages in 
geochronology has always been a matter of serious dispute within geology. It took centuries 
to compare rock formations across the globe and to integrate them into the current framework. 
 
 
The term ‘Anthropocene’ was coined most notably by Nobel laureate in Chemistry Paul J. 
Crutzen, the discoverer of the ozone hole.2 In 2002, for instance, he published a brief article 
in Nature (Crutzen 2002, 23) entitled Geology of Mankind, which inspired a great number of 
geologists. In the stratigraphic (the science of strata) community, a Subcommission on 
Quaternary Stratigraphy was instituted in 2008 in order to collect evidence in mainly three 
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different areas: lithostratigraphic (novel sediments, minerals, and mineral magnetism), 
biostratigraphic (macro- and micropaleontologic successions and anthropogenic traces of 
life), and chemostratigraphic (organic, inorganic, and radiogenic). The task of the commission 
is to resolve, by scientific means, the question of whether humankind has become a factor 
which creates geological changes to an extent which in the past was deemed sufficient for 
declaring the end of an epoch and the beginning of a new one (Waters et al. 2016). 
 
At the 35th International Geological Congress in Cape Town (September 2016), the members 
of the subcommission voted almost unanimously in favour of changing the classification of 
geological epochs and of declaring a new world age – the Anthropocene. This, however, does 
not mean that the official classification of geological epochs is a done deal or that schoolbook 
publishers should start rewriting their textbooks.3 The reason for this is that, within geology, a 
number of subdisciplines are in charge of geological classification. Chronostratigraphy 
classifies strata according to their age of origin. Geochronology is more interpretative, and 
compiles the unfiltered facts into a geological timescale, that is, into a partitioning of Earth 
history into meaningful stages. Superior committees that are yet to be convinced include the 
International Commission on Stratigraphy (ICS) and, as a last step, the executive committee 
of the International Union of Geological Sciences (IUGS). A final vote has not yet been 
scheduled, but the odds are good that the Anthropocene will formally be proclaimed within 
the next few years. 
 
Evidence for a shift in the geological epoch 
With regard to the lithostratigraphic evidence, one marker is the urban structures that 
currently cover around three to five percent of the Earth’s land surface. As a result of 
urbanisation, large areas are by now covered by a mixture of concrete, glass and metals. Even 
if humankind were to go extinct tomorrow, those structures would remain where they are for 
millennia to come. If in a few thousand years from now, if geologists were to visit the place 
where a large city is standing today, they would discover fragments of concrete, rusted iron, 
the bitumen of roads, glass from fibre optic cables, and an enormous of amount of aluminium 
which as such is not found in nature. 
 
Another signature of humankind is visible in the non-decomposing layers of plastic garbage 
currently floating in the maelstrom of certain ocean drifts. There is evidence suggesting that 
they create sedimentary deposits after subsiding. In mid-2014, geologists discovered 
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structures formed by plastics, volcanics, coral fragments and sand grains off the coast of 
Hawai’i which, in view of their solidness, they labelled as a stone of its own kind – as 
plastiglomerate (Chen 2014). However, humankind also creates new sedimentary structures 
by ablating mountains, filling up valleys, and impounding huge seas. Three-quarters of the 
ice-free mainland are no longer in the state they used to be in when the human species 
emerged (Leinfelder 2017). The shifting from wilderness to grasslands in particular is an 
important marker of the enormous changes humanity has brought upon the Earth’s surface. 
While the proportion of non-wilderness was minimal 12,000 years ago, more than a third of 
the Earth’s surface is being used as grassland for livestock even today. If one were to place all 
mammals on a huge scale, one could figure out that humans and their livestock accounted for 
0.1 percent of all biomass at the beginning of the Holocene, while today this share has grown 
to 90 percent of all biomass (Vince 2011). 
 
Further examples of the unprecedented depth and long-term nature of human interventions 
include: 
1. The harvesting of subterranean forests, that is, the extraction of coal, oil and gas from 
the lithosphere. If ever, it would take hundreds of millions of years for these resources 
to regenerate. 
2. The anthropogenic contamination by radioactivity, the timescale of which is likewise 
only measurable in millions of years. 
3. The worldwide flora and fauna species extinction caused by the human species. Nature 
is always in the process of creating new species, so it is indeed only a matter of time 
until the ramifications of the sixth mass extinction will have been ‘processed’ by 
nature. However, this too will run into the low millions of years time-wise. 
4. Climate change, by comparison, is reversible within a much shorter time frame, but 
here too we are dealing with tens of thousands of years. 
5. Space debris has been accumulating in the Earth’s orbit since the beginning of space 
travel, and the forces of nature alone will be unable to dispose of it within the next few 
thousands of years. 
 
When should the beginning of the Anthropocene be set? Points in time that are conceivable 
but have now been ruled out include the beginning of agriculture as well as the beginning of 
the industrial revolution. Many researchers argue in favour of the 1950s, since a large number 
of indicators have been skyrocketing ever since then. Be it urbanisation,4 primary energy 
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consumption, or international air travel – one can date the beginning of several processes of 
exponential growth to the time after World War II, which for that reason has also come to be 
known as the ‘Great Acceleration’ (Steffen et al. 2016). However, some indicators – such as 
the global population – have been on the rise for a somewhat longer period of time, while 
other indicators of the Earth system – such as the depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer – 
have begun to rise only more recently. A preliminary majority decision by the 37-member 
subcommission declared 16 July 1945 – the day of the first atomic-bomb blast – to be the 
least-worst solution. The signature of long-lived plutonium from mid-20th century bomb blasts 
in the sediments will remain visible for thousands of years. This is an unambiguously 
scientific marker of human impact on the environment. 
 
Fig. 1: Nuclear weapons test by the US military at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific Ocean, 1946. Humankind has 
altered the distribution of radionuclides on our planet abruptly and profoundly. 
Source: U.S. Department of Defense 
 
Are there counter-arguments against the proclamation of the Anthropocene? To be sure, the 
impact of humankind on the length of the Earth’s history is miniscule. This can be illustrated 
by a thought experiment by which the history of the planet Earth is converted into one 
calendar year. The Earth is around 4.6 billion years old. Recalibrated to fit into one calendar 
year, one hour equals 525,114 years, one minute is 8,752 years and one second is 145 years. 
In this scale, no humans appeared on the surface of the Earth between 1 January and 30 
December. On the first hours of 31 December, the first human-like apes (hominids) showed 
up. Bipedal walking was still hours (i.e. millions of years) away. Around 20:30 (8:30 pm), 
members of the species homo erectus managed to exit from Africa. At 48 minutes before 
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midnight, they learned to tame the fire; some minutes later they started cooking, and again 
some minutes later they started wearing clothes. Anatomically modern humans appeared 
around 23:36 and they developed a number of sophisticated languages in different places on 
the Earth. The first sculptures and paintings were created around 23:54. The Neolithic 
Revolution (the start of agriculture) took place around 81 seconds before midnight. At 
23:59:24 the first big cities in Egypt and the Indus Valley were built; nevertheless, the 
alphabet and the wheel had still not yet been invented. By 18 seconds before midnight on 31 
December, the first states and empires had been established (Classical Greece, Roman 
Republic, Qin Dynasty, Ashoka Empire), and humankind started to record history. The 
takeaway of this story: the Great Acceleration in the 1950s happened less than one second 
before midnight on this time scale! 
 
As the history of the Earth until now is subdivided more or less equally in ages, as indicated 
by Table 1, each of them usually designates a period of several million years. The Pliocene 
encompasses 2.745 million years, the Pleistocene 2.5763 million years, the Holocene just 
0.0117 million years so far. A counterargument to the proclamation of a new age might be 
that, until much more time has passed, there is simply no vacancy for a new age according to 
the established nomenclature. But this seems to be an artificial argument. Apart from 
tradition, there is no problem with ‘smaller-amount-of-time’ ages. If the real-world 
phenomena change at a quicker pace than before, the nomenclature employed by geologists 
can legitimately be adjusted to keep pace with this. 
 
In the debate about the Anthropocene, it is important to separate empirical from evaluative 
questions. The questions discussed above (If we humans were to perish, would the impact of 
our existence continue to remain for a long time? Or would everything return immediately to 
the way it was before our formation?) are, first of all, empirical questions. But these questions 
also have an evaluative dimension. The notion of the Anthropocene forces us to redefine our 
place in the world, since it addresses humankind in an entirely new way. 
 
Holocene ethics and Anthropocene ethics 
The thoughts of the Ancients, particularly in matters of ethics, were considered to be timeless 
and ever-new for more than two thousand years. That this holds true even today, at least in 
parts, is expressed by the witticism that “where questions of the right life are concerned, only 
that which is false can be truly new” (Spaemann 1989, 9, own translation). This notion, 
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however, is currently brought into question by the concept of the Anthropocene. The ethics 
developed in Ancient Greece was concerned with the vicinity, with dealing with neighbours, 
other estates, the other sex. One might call it an ‘ethics of neighbourhood’ (Tremmel 2009, p. 
3). 
 
Fig. 2: The School of Athens. The fresco by Raphael, completed in 1511, is world-famous. It expresses the 
veneration accorded to ancient Greek thinkers during the age of the Renaissance. 
Source: Wikimedia Commons 
 
In this ethical realm, humans living on the other side of the world were as little an object of 
ethical considerations as humans living 500 years in the future. To put it pointedly: Plato did 
not know of plutonium. In his epoch-making book The Imperative of Responsibility: In 
Search of Ethics for the Technological Age, the philosopher Hans Jonas carved out what was 
once true, or, as one might say, what used to be true during the Holocene: 
 
“that, for all his boundless resourcefulness, man is still small by the measure of 
the elements: precisely this makes his sallies into them so daring and allows those 
elements to tolerate his forwardness. Making free with the denizens of land and 
sea and air, he yet leaves the encompassing nature of those elements unchanged, 
and their generative powers undiminished. […] Much as he harries Earth, the 
greatest of gods, year after year with his plough – she is ageless and unwearied; 
her enduring patience he must and can trust, and to her cycle he must conform” 
(Jonas 1984, 3). 
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In view of the fact that this was no longer true in the second half of the 20th century, Jonas 
urged a new ethics which would transcend the spatial and temporal vicinity. The fields of 
‘global ethics’ and ‘future ethics’ that since have been more and more established as ethical 
subdisciplines of their own are therefore distinctly new phenomena.5 Ethical theories 
developed before the Anthropocene might increasingly become outdated. At any rate, it 
should be undisputed that the house of ethics stands in need of at least some new rooms. 
 
Hercules in Olympus or Gulliver in Lilliput? 
One implication of the proclamation of the Anthropocene evolves around the human 
conception of self. The narcissism of medieval man has suffered two great wounds from 
scientific progress, as Sigmund Freud famously put it in his General Introduction to 
Psychoanalysis (Freud 1920, 246) The first wound, known as the ‘cosmological blow’, was 
the discovery that the Earth is not, in fact, at the centre of the universe (Copernican 
Revolution 1543). Humankind thereby lost its central position within the cosmos. Roughly 
three hundred years later, the so-called ‘biological blow’ occurred when it was discovered that 
humankind is embedded in the developmental system of the organisms (Charles Darwin 1859 
and others). The species Homo sapiens is a product of evolution just as millions of other 
species are. In both cases, humankind’s belief in its central position within the cosmos or 
within animated nature was deeply shaken by the findings of modern natural science. 
 
The Anthropocene discourse does not add a further blow. On the contrary, the notion of an 
‘age of men’ has the connotation that humankind, as a collective, is much more powerful than 
previously thought. Human leverage is much bigger than one used to think in the early days of 
the environmental movement. However, one must be beware of the naturalistic fallacy. The 
fact that the human species has become a quasi-geological force at its current point of 
existence surely does not mean that this state of affairs is imperative. This would be the same 
naturalistic fallacy as if a political philosopher were to infer from the mere existence of a 
certain form of rule that this particular form of rule ought to exist. 
 
What is new about the Anthropocene is not the insight that humankind changes nature in 
various ways – this much was known in the 20th century. Rather, the concept of an 
Anthropocene implies that the human species affects its environment in a deeply profound 
and long-term way through unconscious, almost incidental actions. Consider, by way of 
example, the ozone hole. As is well known, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) used to occur mainly 
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in deodorants, air conditioners and fridges. It is unsettling that a few inventions designed to 
raise human comfort just by a little should have such grave effects on the stratospheric ozone 
layer. 
 
Humankind was equally surprised at its degree of impact with regard to the problem of plastic 
garbage in the oceanic currents. In the 1980s, scientists were still used to assuming that the 
plastic particles were environmentally irrelevant, since the oceans were thought of as huge 
and resilient. It was a surprise to our species to find an enormous layer of plastic (some have 
called it a plastic continent) in the vastness of the Pacific Ocean, and yet more garbage 
patches in similar out-of-the-way places that are of little interest to humankind and that have 
hardly ever been visited. 
 
For the self-image of humankind and its view of the environment, there are two possible 
interpretations of the geological facts. The first is that humankind has become a new 
Hercules. The other – and, in my view, better – interpretation compares him to the role of 
Gulliver. Hercules is the great, invincible hero, assertive and often ruthless, someone who is 
able to perform the most difficult labours with ease. Gulliver, however, has to come to grips 
with a new environment that only at first sight resembles his familiar environment. In the 
socio-critical novel by Jonathan Swift published in 1726, the Lilliputians referred to Gulliver 
as the Man-Mountain. Gulliver himself must quickly learn to move slowly in what is to him 
the unknown Land of Lilliput. Gulliver knows that there is much he does not know; and he is 
also aware that, due to his height, every misstep (literally speaking) can have disastrous 
consequences for his environment. He soon realises that, despite of his size, he himself is in 
danger, too, precisely because he has troubles adapting to his environment. The story of 
Gulliver seems perfectly suited to serve as the core narrative of the Anthropocene. This story 
could represent the idea that the human species increasingly changes its surrounding nature 
without (yet) being capable of controlling the negative consequences of these changes. 
 
In view of growing insights on the unintended consequences of human actions, fantasies of 
power and doability – think of climate engineering – should be discouraged rather than 
promoted. Rather than acting as a new Hercules, who masterfully triumphs in one quest after 








3. Reforming democracy 
A wake-up call that is overdue 
The ecological crisis brings the failure of our current way of living to the fore. All political 
efforts since the beginning of explicit environmental and sustainability policies in the 1970s 
have fallen short of what is necessary. “The measures taken, important though they might 
have been for particular regions and sectors, were unable to impede the great acceleration 
from a global perspective, and have mostly just led to spatial or temporal relocations. A 
sustainability science which takes the provocation posed by the Anthropocene seriously ought 
to be dealing with this skandalon” (Görg 2016, 10, own translation). 
 
Almost all key indicators for ecological performance are turning bad. Take, for instance, 
human-made climate change: The curve of global greenhouse gas emissions continues to 
point steeply upwards, despite enormous efforts to reduce anthropogenic emissions. The only 
traceable drops occur during wars and economic crises. In 2009, the global financial and 
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economic crisis led to a decrease in global greenhouse gas emissions of 1.3 percent. Already 
in the following year, however, emissions went back to a growth of 5.9 percent.  
 
One should draw a distinction between indicators which could be seen as more of a direct 
consequence of government policy and ones whose causes are less directly attributable to 
government policy, or are more closely related to the power of economics and individual 
choices. Put differently, there is an important distinction in measuring how certain countries 
are governed, on the one hand, and how certain societies behave. While it is true that not all 
indicators are amenable to the levers of government policy, the rest of this chapter argues the 
case for improving our political institutions. The fact that far too few people maintain an 
environmentally sustainable lifestyle can (and should) be influenced by policies. 
 
It is not very controversial any more in philosophy that the ‘neighbour ethics’ that was very 
useful in the Holocene is of limited use for the future in this new era. But it is less understood 
that the ecological crisis is also a crisis of democracy as a form of government. Our political 
institutions, as we know them, were designed in and for the Holocene. The transition into a 
new phase of geology necessitates a reform of these institutions, namely parliamentarianism. 
One should not think of ‘the Anthropocene concept’ as just another frame, but rather 
understand it as an eye-opener and a wake-up call to reform democracy.  
 
Before outlining what such a reform might look like, two caveats seem to be necessary: one 
with regard to the superiority of democracy to all other forms of political rule; the second with 
regard to the limited use of posterity protection clauses in constitutions. 
 
Democracy as a valuable inheritance for future generations 
Reforming democracy, to be sure, does not mean calling its essential value into question. 
Since the 1970s (e.g. Ophuls 1977), some unnecessary ink has been spilt pleading for an eco-
authoritarian ‘solution’ (for a summary, see Hammond/Smith 2017). Especially after a series 
of failed international climate conferences between 2009 and 2014 before the success in Paris 
2015 (and then again when US president Donald Trump opted out of this accord in 2017), 
several contributions to the debate asked whether democracy is the best form of government 
to cope with ecological challenges (Shearman/Smith 2007, Randers 2012). 
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This provocative question is misleading, whether it is answered in the affirmative or not. At 
any rate, the international climate conferences are a bad case in point, given that not only 
democratic but also non-democratic nation-states contributed to the failure of the negotiations. 
Comparative studies have shown that the environmental performance of authoritative regimes 
is worse than that of democracies (Jänicke 1996). On average, authoritarian regimes display 
less concern for the future interests of their citizens, and they typically engender patronage 
and corruption (Boston 2017). So-called epistocrats (proposing rule by those who have 
knowledge) could reply in return that they don’t advocate authoritarianism per se, but an 
enlightened non-democratic rule. One lesson from history is that there is no way to ensure that 
an enlightened dictator does not abandon his benevolence eventually. Some 150 years ago, at 
a time when intellectuals open-mindedly discussed whether or not democracy is better than 
monarchy or aristocracy, Mill wrote sensible words that are still (or again) worth reading 
today: 
 
“In no government will the interests of the people be the object, except where the 
people are able to dismiss their rulers as soon as the devotion of those rulers to the 
interests of the people becomes questionable” (Mill 1977, 73). 
 
In the long run, no other form of government but democracy is better suited to solving global 
environmental problems. 
 
Posterity protection provisions in constitutions do not suffice 
The growing acceptance of responsibility for future generations has led to the trend of 
including posterity protection clauses in constitutions. Insofar as constitutions have been 
newly adopted – for example in Eastern Europe and Central Asia after 1989, or in South 
Africa after the end of apartheid – a regard for generations was inscribed in almost all of these 
cases. Even well-established constitutions were changed in order to reflect the increasing 
future-mindedness of citizenries around the world. Five constitutions speak explicitly of 
‘rights of future generations’: Norway (art. 110b), Japan (art. 11), Iran (art. 50), Bolivia (art. 
7), and Malawi (art. 13, art. 11). In other constitutional texts, for instance in art. 37 (4) of the 
Georgian constitution, the ‘interests’ of future generations are addressed; alternatively their 
'needs', e.g. in the constitution of Uganda (Art. XXVII ii). 
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The number of constitutions with posterity protection clauses is already considerable, and it 
continues to grow. But does this make any difference? A sobering conclusion seems in order. 
The establishment of such clauses has resulted neither in the phasing out of nuclear power nor 
in serious climate action in the respective countries. Constitutional courts are obviously not 
optimal to serve as the guardians of future generations’ interests: they cannot represent such 
interests with full commitment for the simple reason that they have no mandate to do so. 
 
Paradigm shift from a three- to a four-power-model 
What is required in the Anthropocene is nothing less than a paradigm shift. The new paradigm 
would entail a ‘future branch’, and regard it as a legitimate and necessary part of a 
democratically constituted community. The linchpin of this paradigm would be that the age-
old separation of powers into legislative, executive and judicial branches is no longer 
sufficient in the Anthropocene. The present-day demos of the 21st century can affect the living 
conditions of a future demos far more than in former times. Just as in the 18th century, when 
in the course of first establishing a democracy in a large territorial state, the Federalist Papers 
considered a system of checks and balances to protect minorities against the ‘tyranny of 
majority’ (Tocqueville 1835/1840), so today we are in need of checks and balances against 
the tyranny of the present over the future. 
 
It seems appropriate to draw on the history of ideas to conceptualise the new ‘future branch’. 
The historical roots of the separation of powers are usually associated with the political 
theorists John Locke and Charles de Montesquieu. However, even a thinker as early as 
Aristotle already recommended a mixed constitution or, more specifically, a mixture of 
democracy and oligarchy, which he called ‘politie’, designed to prevent an excessive 
concentration of power. In his Two Treatises of Government, published in 1690, John Locke 
distinguishes between legislative and executive, but leaves no room for an independent third 
judicial power. Locke introduces a clear hierarchy of powers when he writes that “this 
legislative is not only the supreme power of the common-wealth, but sacred and unalterable in 
the hands where the community has once placed it” (Locke 1823, Chapter XI, § 134). 
 
Montesquieu, the actual father of the tripartite separation of powers doctrine, applies the 
classical division of legislative, executive and judiciary power in his De l'esprit des lois of 
1748. In the sixth chapter of the 11th book (Montesquieu 2001), which mainly deals with the 
English constitution, he is concerned with the sharing and balancing of powers. Montesquieu 
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(2001, 173) writes: “In every government there are three sorts of power: the legislative; the 
executive, in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive, in regard to 
things that depend on the civil law.” Following this statement, Montesquieu explains that this 
latter power is to be referred to as the judiciary power of the state. This brings us to the classic 
tripartite division of legislative, executive and judicial power. 
 
The trias politica was conceived by thinkers in the 17th and 18th century and is now 
universally established in Western democracies. The view of our present three-power-model 
changes when we learn about the evolution from a two- to a three-power-model in the 
approaches of Locke and Montesquieu. The most important lesson from the history of ideas 
seems to be that even the supposedly definitive present is only a stage between the past and 
the future. The tripartite division was sufficient for the past; but at the brink of the 21st century 
it does not suffice any more. 
 
A few remarks with regard to the ‘vertically’ directed separation of powers seem appropriate. 
In federal states like Germany, for example, the federalisation of political systems means the 
division of labour between a local level, a Länder level and a national level, complemented by 
the European Union (EU). The Länder have governments, parliaments and constitutional 
courts. The European level also has a parliament (the EU parliament), a court (European 
Court of Justice) and a sort of government (the European Commission). In a four-power 
system, all such levels should get ‘future branches’ as well to complement their ‘horizontal’ 
separation of powers. 
 
Apart from the horizontal and vertical ‘separation of powers’, further overloading the term is 
of little use. The media is also often referred to colloquially as ‘the fourth power’. The same 
applies for interest groups such as trade unions or employers’ associations. It is true that the 
power of the political system does not fully penetrate other autonomous areas such as 
business, science, media, religion, or private relationships; however, to prevent confusion the 
term ‘separation of powers’ should continue to refer to the organisation of state power. The 
terminology used here counts only the ‘branches of government’ (not society) and adds a 
fourth such branch to the existing three. 
 
The legislative branch passes the laws, the executive branch implements them, and the 
judiciary controls their abidance. Constitutional courts also check the constitutionality of laws 
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after the legislative branch has passed them. Where does the ‘future branch’ fit in here? This 
branch could be designed as a body which checks the sustainability of laws, and quashes them 
if they harm future citizens. Alternatively, it is quite possible to see the ‘future branch’ 
somewhat closer to the legislative than to the judiciary branch, namely as a body with the 
right to initiate legislation instead of preventing it. 
 
It should not be forgotten that the idea of the trias politica currently varies from country to 
country as a result of different traditions of political thought. With regard to institutions for 
future generations, there cannot be a one-size-fits-all solution; rather, it seems apt to conceive 
of such a representative body differently for each country. ‘Future branch’ is thus an umbrella 
term that does not designate a particular model. Instead, it refers to all institutions for future 
generations that are powerful enough to credibly represent the needs and interests of future 
citizens. Throughout the globe, there are now a considerable number of organisations with a 
mandate for sustainability and intergenerational justice. However, most of these enjoy merely 
consultative status. They exercise little actual power in a Weberian sense: “Power means 
every chance in a social relation to realise one’s own will even against the resistance of 
others” (Weber 1922, § 16, own translation). 
 
The legitimacy of a future branch 
Repudiating the charge of ‘dictatorship’ 
The idea of a fourth branch is new and has not been aired in political science, philosophy or 
law so far. As a reaction to the ecological crisis, a number of scholars and institutions (e.g. 
WBGU 2011) have called for a transformation of our society that goes beyond marginalia, but 
they have not called for a Four-Power-Model. Nevertheless, the discussion about institutions 
for the representation of future generations is well under way (Stein 1998; Barry 1999; 
Eckersley 2004; Thompson 2010; Read 2011; González-Ricoy/Gosseries 2016; Boston 2017; 
Tremmel 2006; 2015; 2018; 2019). These institutions have been given various names. I will 
call them offices for future generations (OFGs); and I take them as embodiments for the 
future branch if they are powerful enough – that is, if OFGs are given real power by their 
statutes and in practice. In this last part of this chapter I will discuss the legitimacy of OFGs in 
the context of the four-power-model. 
 
OFGs should be unelected bodies. While popular elections would maximize the formal 
independence of the organisation’s members – vis-à-vis the legislative, executive, and judicial 
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branches – they would inescapably subject the election candidates to the short-termist 
pressures of parliamentary elections, thereby defeating the purpose for which the office was 
created. Given that electorates tend to be biased in favour of the present, those candidates for 
OFGs who promise to cater for the short-term wishes of their constituencies would be at an 
advantage. If the candidates for the OFG had to run campaigns and court votes, they would de 
facto turn into politicians. No longer would knowledge and expertise be the decisive qualities, 
but eloquence and smoothness. 
 
Lacking a popular mandate, OFGs could be criticized as unaccountable, or, more drastically, 
as a form of ‘expertocracy’ (which is the same as ‘epistocracy’, just more negatively 
connoted). Expertocracy, literally meaning the rule of experts, has been discussed in political 
theory for a long time, arguably since Plato promoted it for Kallipolis, the utopian city in his 
dialogue Politeia. Here again, terminology is crucial for concept formation. Fischer (1990) 
highlights the dangers of ‘technocracy’ but, to be sure, ‘technocracy’ and ‘expertocracy’ 
should not be conflated. It is likely that experts in an OFG might be rather opposed to a 
technocratic stance. Terminologically, the model proposed here could be criticized as paving 
the way to a ‘future-dictatorship’, not a ‘technocratic dictatorship’, if anything at all. 
 
But such a criticism would be unfounded. To put it into perspective, let’s recall the rights of 
the third branch in the existing Three-Branches-Model. In many countries, constitutional 
courts exercise enormous power in interpreting if a specific law is compatible with the 
constitution. The doctrine of a living constitution allows courts to overrule parliament if the 
court’s present interpretation of a constitution’s semantics is in contradiction to passed 
legislation. This is of course country-specific. To this day, popular sovereignty is equated 
much more closely with parliamentary sovereignty in some countries than in others. But on a 
global level, the readiness of constitutional courts to challenge legislatures is generally 
increasing rather than decreasing (Rosanvallon 2011). 
 
The debate between proponents of popular sovereignty and its most important institution, 
namely parliaments, on the one hand, and proponents of constitutionalism and the power of 
courts on the other hand, can serve as a blueprint for a debate about the democratic legitimacy 
of OFGs. To cut a long story short, most scholars agree that courts might be unelected bodies, 
but they serve democracy quite well. If this is agreed, then the charge of 'dictatorship' cannot 
reasonably directed against OFGs, as their competencies (if they are well-designed) come not 
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even close to those of courts. ‘Expertocracy’, if this term is intended to be meaningful, always 
designates an authoritarian solution to the environmental crises. As a one-power-model in a 
Hobbesian sense,6 such an authoritarian construct is per se incompatible with the Four-Power-
Model defended here. After all, all models of power-sharing are aimed at diffusing state 
power, not concentrating it. This has been formulated in the following terms: “Because man, 
who has power, has a propensity to misuse power when he is not prevented from doing so by 
boundaries, it is necessary that power is divided between many authorities, which mutually 
prevent each other’s misuse” (Riklin 2006, 290). Que le pouvoir arrête le pouvoir! 
 
OFGs should be proposers, not preventers 
I have argued elsewhere (Tremmel 2018) the case for a German Future Council, endowed 
with a right of initiative, allowing it to introduce proposals for new legislation into the 
parliament. OFGs, composed of independent appointees, are not at odds with the principle of 
democratic legitimacy if (and only if) they do not have the power to stop the law-making 
process of the legislative branch. The key criterion suggested here for the design of OFGs is 
‘proactiveness’, in the sense of a right to initiate legislation. Such OFGs would use their 
power differently than courts, as they would not have the right to suspend laws temporarily or 
permanently, but only to propose them. We should think of OFGs as proposers, not 
preventers. 
 
OFGs might be less able to assert themselves, compared to courts, but the power to partake in 
the agenda-setting of the law-making process should not be underestimated. In order to allow 
an OFG to place bills on the formal voting agenda, most parliaments would just have to 
change their rules of procedure. Bills usually have to be signed either by a party fraction or, 
inter-fractionally, by a certain percentage of all members of the parliament. If an OFG, in its 
capacity as representative for future citizens, did also get the right to initiate laws, its motions 
would be treated like inter-fractional motions – the proceedings of which are often shining 
examples of parliamentarianism. 
 
The strengthening of the scientific and academic elements of parliamentarian debates, as 
suggested in my proposal, does not imply that the legislators must necessarily follow the 
scholarly advice of an OFG. Indeed, it would be naïve to believe that the legislature would 
take up and implement each and every proposal made by the Future Council.7 Rather, past 
experience with inter-fractional motions would suggest that parliament would pass on most of 
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the Future Council’s legislative initiatives to committees, where they would face a silent death 
by non-treatment.8 However, there is reasonable hope that at least in some cases the 
legislative initiatives brought forward by the Future Council might be able to garner the 
support of future-oriented lawmakers, as well as that of the press and public opinion. 
 
A fourth branch of government, embodied in a Future Council, is not at odds with the 
principle of democratic legitimacy as long as such a new body does not have the power to 
stop the law-making process of the legislative branch. By limiting itself to a purely 
constructive role, the legitimacy of such a Future Council is ensured. The charge of an 
‘future-dictatorship’ cannot be directed against such a Future Council as this charge only 
makes sense when talking about organisations that can either make or stop laws.  
 
To be sure, the model of a Future Council as presented here transcends the dualist 
interpretation of science and politics spelled out in their respective binary codes of 
‘knowledge’ and ‘power’. Unlike political advisors, the independent members of a Future 
Council would not approach politicians as mere supplicants, hoping for a willing ear that may 
be lent but doesn’t have to be. While on the one hand the power of decision-making fully 
remains with the politicians, on the other the element of long-term rationality is strengthened 
by parliament’s obligation to at least consider the Future Council’s proposals. The endemic 
problem of politics’ resistance to advice is not entirely solved, but mitigated. In times like 
these, with politicians like US president Trump presenting their own ‘alternative facts’ by 
consciously disregarding – or even showing contempt for – scientific insights, there is need 
for a stronger coupling of politics and science. Knowledge ought to play a role in political 
decision-making. 
 
The prevention of an additional veto player 
The logic of proactiveness not only renders the charge of a ‘future-dictatorship’ (or ‘eco-
dictatorship’) invalid; it also prevents another ‘veto player’. Traditionally, institutionalists 
have examined dichotomous classifications (unitary vs. federalist, parliamentarian vs. 
presidential etc.). By contrast, Tsebelis's theory of veto players (Tsebelis 2002) asks how 
many actors must consent to a decision or are able to veto it. Multi-level parliamentarianism 
already features a high number of veto players, such as the second legislative chamber, the 
constitutional court, the president (if he or she has to formally sign laws in parliamentary 
systems), and the people itself, insofar as it makes itself heard through referenda. 
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There is a risk that creating a fully operational OFG will result in the addition of a new veto 
player, thereby increasing the chances of gridlock in the political system. In contrast to some 
theories that advocate slowing democracy down (Clark and Teachout 2012, Ekeli 2009), I see 
political gridlock as a drawback in times when problems such as climate change demand 
urgent action. Not slowing down the political system is a strong additional argument for 
giving OFGs the right to initiate legislation, but not the right to prevent it.  
 
The right to delay law-making (for a limited period of time, not indefinitely) seems to lie 
somewhat in between the input and the output side of the political process. But in fact, 
postponement rights are not initial or constructive actions; they are part of a reactive capacity. 
They can be a sharp sword too, as Shlomo Shoham, the one and only Knesset Commissioner 
for Future Generations in Israel, explains: “The right to be given enough time to prepare an 
opinion is an implied authority to create a delay in the legislative process. Such a delay may 
be crucial for the parliamentary work when it comes to bills discussed in the framework of the 
state’s budget. In that case, the time factor is vital since the implication of not voting on the 
state’s budget for the next year (...) is that parliament must dissolve itself and go to elections” 
(Shoham/Lamay 2006, p. 248). While this might be a peculiarity of the political system in 
Israel, the US-American experience with filibustering highlights that delaying resistance is 
often difficult to overcome at all. 
 
Independent bodies have been a fundamental part of democratic architecture since classical 
Athens – just think of scrutineers, auditors, supervisors and later constitutional courts and 
public ombudsman. The role of such bodies is supportive for democracy as they equip it 
against the anxieties of the majoritarian principle. OFGs are democratically legitimized as 
long as they are granted their status by law – and as long as this status can be revoked by law 
as well (Rosanvallon 2011). Unelected representatives of future citizens, appointed by elected 
politicians but not for their pleasure (Pettit 2012, 306), are a necessary and legitimate 
instrument against political presentism. 
 
Conclusion 
OFGs are more than just a vision or illusion. The future-orientated part of the political class 
takes a genuine interest in amending the rules of the game so as to engage the self-
commitment of the entire political class. This nourishes the hope that a special version of 
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OFGs, future councils characterized by the right to initiate legislation, will eventually come 
into existence. An increasing number of experiments with such bodies, and the lessons learnt, 
alter the political landscapes in more and more countries in a both spirited and innovative 
way. The problem of political presentism cannot be solved, only alleviated. But limiting the 
size of this problem would be no small achievement. In fact, it is of paramount importance for 




                                                          
Notes 
1 The ‘Six Ages of the World’ (Latin: sex aetates mundi) doctrine was a Christian 
periodisation put forward by Church Father Augustine of Hippo (354-430), which endured 
well into the Middle Ages. It was repudiated during the Enlightenment. The pioneer 
geological works by Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (1707-1788) and Charles Lyell 
(1797-1875) paved the way towards the modern worldview which rests upon scientific 
insights rather than on assertions from Holy Scriptures. 
2 Others have suggested similar concepts much earlier, such as ‘anthropolithic era’ (Haeckel 
1870), ‘anthropozoic era’ (Stoppani 1873), and ‘Noosphere’ (Teilhard de Chardin 1923). 
3 The potential of the following new mission statement would be particularly relevant for 
school curricula (Crutzen/Schwägerl 2011). The term ‘Anthropocene’ might help students to 
grasp the idea of the enormous impact of humankind on nature. The pupil who carelessly used 
to dispose of his candy wrapper in nature, thinking that it would decompose quickly there, 
might be inspired to change his behaviour by the concept of an Anthropocene. 
4 Haber (2015, p. 29, own translation) describes urbanisation as the constitutive feature of the 
Anthropocene: “It is due to this development that from an ecological point of view, one can 
base the Anthropocene on one criterion alone – to wit, on the greatest possible centralisation 
of the a central system ‘nature’ – with its transformation into culture – towards its human user 
who is centred around the city.” 
5 To which it must be added that the future is not a moral object (moral patient) in itself, and 
rather what is of concern here are human beings living in the future – hence for a diachronic, 
temporal ethics, the notion of ‘generational ethics’ is more appropriate than the term ‘future 
ethics’. 
6 For Hobbes, men only overcome the state of nature when they agree upon a social contract 
amongst themselves, which subordinates them to the rule and authority of an abstract body. In 
the Leviathan (1651), Hobbes writes: “The only way to erect such a common power, as may 
be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and 
thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their own industry and by the fruits of the Earth 
they may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is to confer all their power and strength 
upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of 
voices, unto one will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to 
bear their person; and every one to own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever 
he that so beareth their person shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern 
the common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their 
judgements to his judgement” (2000, 105-106). 
7 When I write Future Council, I am referring to the here described specific OFG (with the 
right to initiate laws), using capital letters to distinguish it from the more generic usage of the 
term future council. 
8 For a more comprehensive account, including some Figures, of the treatment of inter-
fractional motions in the German Parliament, see Tremmel 2018. 
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